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IN THE 
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AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1943 
ELIZABETH ROLLER BOTTIMORE 
versus 
THE FIRST AND MERCHANTS NATIO,NALBANK 0], 
RICHMOND, ET .ALS. 
To the Honorable Chief Ju,stice ant:l Justices of the Supreme 
. Court of Appeals of JTirginia: 
Your petitioner, Elizabeth Roller Bottimore, avers that 
she is aggrieved by a final decree entered in the Law & Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, on the 27th day of 
May, 1937, in a chancery cause therein pending in which she 
was plaintiff and The First and Merchants National.Bank 
of Richmond, (Mrs.) Wilfrid Pyle, (Miss) Lucy Roller, (Mrs.) 
Frances R. Grattan and (Mrs.) Margaret S. Ogilvie were 
defendants. Your petitioner presents herewith a transcript 
of the record in the case and prays that an appeal may be 
granted to her from the decree complained of; that the same 
may be set aside and annulled and that final judgment may 
be entered in this Court in favor of your petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
On the 17th day of December, 1927, the appellant herein, 
Elizabeth Roller, being at the time single and having no 
mother or father living, and the named defendants herein, 
other than the First and Merchants Natio.nal Bank of Rich-
mond, being her only next of kin then living (see R., pp. 1, 
2 and 12), entered into a trust agreement (Exhibit "A", R., 
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pp. 4, 5, 6 and 7) whereby she stated the intention of de-
livering over to the defendant, The First and Merchants 
N ~ tional Bank of Richmond, certain property to be held in 
trust upon the terms and conditions in such instrument men-
tioned and s~t out, to be held in trust for her sole benefit 
during her life and upon her death to be distributed as she 
should indicate by will, and in the event she died intestate, 
or upon her failure to dispose of said property by will, to 
b_e distributed in such manner as provided under the terms 
-of the trust agreement. · 
On March 4, 1936, the appellant having, since the execution 
of this instrument, n1arried, she being· desirous of revoking 
the said trust so created, filed a petition in the Law & Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, setting out the nature 
and existence of the trust, stating her desire to revoke the 
same and seeking a decree of court abrogating and revoking 
such trust agreement. As defendants to this petition were 
named The First and Merchants National Bank of Richmond, 
trustees under the trust agreement, and all of the then liv-
ing persons named and mentioned in the trust agreement, to-
wit: (Mrs.) Wilfrid Pyle, (Miss.) Lucy Roller, (Mrs.) Frances 
R. Grattan and (Mrs.) J\IIargaret. S. Ogilvie. 
This petition (R., pp. 1-3) alleges that the petitioner is 
the only party beneficiary under the terms of the trust agree-
ment, but that inasmuch· as her sisters aforementioned are 
named therein that they are made parties to the suit. 
AU parties defendant answered the petition filed, all ac-
quiescing in the proposed revocation. 
The Court, thereupon, entered a decree refusing the relief 
sought on the g-round that the trust was irrevocable and from 
such final decree this appeal is sought. 
SINGLE ISSUE PRESENTED. 
The single issue presented for determination in this case 
is whether or not the trust agreement executed by Elizabeth 
Roller Bottimore, at the time Elizabeth H. Roller, to the First 
and Merchants National Bank of Richmond, Virginia, is sub-
ject to revocation as sought by the trustor in this proceeding. 
It is the position of the petitioner, Elizabeth Roller Botti-
more, that, under the terms of the agreement set out in the 
trust, she has a perfect legal right to terminate the trust at 
her own election and that it was not her purpose or intent 
in executing the trust in question to impair or destroy her 
right to reassume 'the full possession and enjoyment of her 
property at any time upon her individual election. The po-
sition of the trustee, the First and ~ferchants National Bank 
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of Richmond, Virginia, is duly stated in its answer filed in 
these proceedings, namely, that while the Bank does not as-
sume to interpret the provisions of the contract in question 
from a legal standpoint, it consents and agrees to the extent 
'of the power and interest which it possesses to consent to 
agree, under the terms of such instrument, that an order 
may ·be entered by the Court revoking and cancelling the con-
tract as requested by the trustor. 
It is established under the pleadings and evidence that 
Elizabeth Roller Bottimore has no children and that her 
next-of-kin, namely, her four sisters, have been made parties 
to this suit; that such have answered and through such an-
swer these parties likewise consent and agree that the Court 
may enter an order annulling, revoking and cancelling· the 
contract as prayed for by the petitioner. In other words, to 
state it differently, the plaintiff or petitioner assumes the 
right to terminate the trust and contends that she is the only 
person or party interested in its termination, while the trus-
tee cautiously refrains from expressing any opinion as to the 
legal right of termination, ·interposes no objection thereto; 
arid such is likewise the position of the sisters, the petitioner's 
next-of-kin. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The trial court erred in holding that the trust agreement 
sought to be revoked and set aside by petitioner was an 
irrevocable trust and not subject to revocation as prayed for 
by petitioner, and in so refusing to enter a decree revoking 
the same. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. 
Before considering the exact question here presented there 
are several well recognized rules· governing the law of trusts 
controlling the rig·ht of revocation which should be here men-
tioned at the outset. 
In the first place it is a well-established and uncontradicted 
rule that any trust which has once been executed and the 
trust accepted by the trustee, is irrevocable at the instance 
of the trustor provided any interest thereunder vests in third 
· p~rsons other than the trustor or trustee. 
Hurt v. Gil'lner, 40 F. (2nd) 794. 
Schroeder v. Woodu,ard and others, 116 Va. 506. 
There are, however, several well-established exceptions to 
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this rule which are equally as well recognized and undisputed 
as the rule itself. In the fitst place, if there is a power of revo-
cation expressly i'eserved in the instrument the ge~ei·al weight 
of authority is that such ttust is revocable in the instance. 
of the trustor p·rovided, of course; the resei'vation of powet; 
by express stipulation accrues to the trustor. 
Nichols v. Emery, 109 Col. 323. 
Garter v~ Il ou_gh, 86 Va. 668. 
The second exception is wher•e all of the beneficiaries to 
whom accrue vested intet·ests under the trust join with the 
trustor in a request that the trust be revoked. 
Short v. Wilson, 13 Johns (N. Y.) 33. 
Armistead's Ex'ors. v. II actt anr.l ·Others. 
In no case is the consent of the trustee necessary unless, 
of course, he is a beneficiary under the trust instrument, since 
his right to his commission does not in any manner consti-
tute him a beneficiary under the trust. 
Western Battery and 8JJ-pplJ1 Co. v. Hazelett Sto'rage Bat-
terJJ Co., 61 Feel (2nd) 220. 
Nu:P does it make any difference whatsoever that the in-
strument itself contains a provision that the trust shall be 
irrevocable since whether or not a trust is irrevocable or 
not depends entirely upon the nature of the iristrhlnent itself 
and provided the instrument is of such nature that the 
trustor has the right of revocation,. the mere stipulation 
therein that the trust shall be considered irrevocable, does 
not deprive the trustor of this rig·ht. 
Bch·wartz v. Fulton Tntst Co., 198 N. Y. S. 275. 
The last, and the most important situation, however, is 
'\vhere a trustor is allowed to revo~~ a trust, is where sueh 
trustor or settlor is the only beneficiary under the terms of 
the trust instrument.; that is to say, there are no other per-
sons to whom any vested interests accrue under the terms 
of the instrument. 
It is with this exception that we are here inter~sted since 
the trust agreement, the constructi.on of which is here under 
consideration, is an instrument of this nature. 
The only article in this agreement' with which we are con-
cerned in Article 4 since if any interest accrue to any par-
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ties other than the trustor, it would accrue by virtue of this 
article which reads as follows: 
''ARTICLE IV. On the death of the trustor the corpus 
and accumulated income, if any, of the Trust Fund shall pass 
as the Trustor shall direct by "rill, and, if the Trustor shall 
die intestate as to the Trust Fund, it shall be divided among 
her children who survive her and the lawful issue, per stirpes, 
of those children who predecease the Trustor leaving sucl1 
issue who survive her, but the shares or parts of shares of 
all minor beneficiaries shall be held by the Trustee who shall 
expend on the several minor b~neficiaries the net income and 
so much of the corpus of their respective shares or parts of 
shares as the Trustee in its absolute discretion shall deem 
necessary for their maintenance, support andjor education 
and/or for any emergency sufficient in the opinion of the 
trustee to warrant such action, until each shall in turn reach 
the age of twenty-one years, when the corpus or so much 
as remains thereof shall be paid over outright and free of 
all trusts. The shares of any of the children of the Trus-
tor who take under this Article but die before becoming 
twenty-one years of age, unmarried and 'vithout lawful is-
sue, shall revert to the Trust Fund and pass under the terms 
of this agreement. If, however, there be a widow, or wid-
ower, and/or lawful issue surviving, the said shares shall 
pass according to the provisions of the Virginia Statutes for 
Descents and Distribution as then in effect. If the Trustor 
shall die intestate and 'vithout leaving lawful issue who sur-
vive her, then whatever remains of the Trust Fund shall be 
equally divided among· those sisters of the Grantor who sur-
vive her and the lawful issue, per stirpes, of those sisters 
who predecease he,r leaving la,vful issue who survive her, ab-
solutely and fr~e of all trusts.'' 
An examination of this section of the instrument, consid-
ered with the instrument as a whole, clearly indicates that 
the intention of the trustor as expressed in this instrument 
and particularly in .Article 4, is as follows : 
That such trustor turn.ed over to the trustee the property 
in question with the understanding that she and she alone 
was to have all of the rents, income, and issues, which an-
nually resulted from the corpus of the estate, paid to her 
during· her lifetime after the annual expenses, such as taxes, 
fees, etc., had been deducted. lJ nder Article 4 of the trustor 
reserves the right to dispose of both the corpus and accumu-
lated incon1e by will in any manner she so desires and then 
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provides that in the case of the trustor dying intestate that 
said corpus and accumulated income shall be divided among 
her children who survive her and the lawful issues, per stirpes 
of those children who predecease the trustor leaving such is-
sue who survive her (the trustor). 
The only question then in which w~ are interested is 
whether this contingency in the case of the trustor dying in-
testate be considered as vesting any present interest in these 
persons mentioned in Article IV. 
RIGHT OF REVOCATION IN THE INSTANT CASE~ 
In the light of these recognized rules it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the unquestioned right of revocation exists in 
the instant case for the following reasons: 
1. It is always of vital importance in the construction of a 
will or trust agreement to rea.d the instrument as a whole 
' with a view towards ascertaining the intent of the testator 
or creator. On the question of revocation of a trust one of 
the primary issues as to whether the creator intended to part 
with the title and interest in the trust fund and to put it out 
of the creator's grasp beyond the power of rev·ocation. A 
consideration of the instrument as a whole in the instant case 
will show that not only was it not the intent of the creator 
to so alienate the trust fund, but that, furthermore, her acts, 
as expressed by the instrument did not do so. 
2. The creator, Elizabeth Roller, was the only person in-
terested, beneficially or otherwise, under the terms of the trust 
agreement. 
3. Paragraph IV of the trust instrument providing for dis-
tribution among certain persons in the event of the creator 
dying intestate as to the trust fund created merely an estate 
of expectancy in such persons not to take effect or come into 
being· until the death of such creator and such interest there-
fore, under the established law of this and other jurisdictions 
does not create such ''beneficial interest'' in the trust fund 
as to bar creator from revocation at will. 
4. Even did such provision create a beneficial interest ''in 
praesenti" in the named persons-which it is urged that it 
did not under the authorities of this jurisdiction-yet since 
such persons named were the same persons who would have 
taken-and in the order named-in the event of intestacy of 
creator, such interests are re'lJersionary and as such, under 
thP. unanimous authorities, are not such interests as would 
bar revocation by the creator. 
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5. In order that. a trust instrument be revocable, it does 
not have to contain an express power of revocation. Such 
can be implied and should be implied under the facts of the 
case at bar. 
6. An examination of the form of the instrument embody-
ing the trust agreement in the instant case shows clearly two 
things: 
(a) That it was never the intention of the creator therein 
to pass away from herself complete control of the corpus 
of the fund and -
(b) That the form of the instrument is-from a point of 
view of conveyancing-incapable of conveying the fund away 
from the creator. 
These points will be considered in the O!der named. 
1. Intention· of Creator: 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of this State has within 
the last year handed down a decision of significant import-
anc~ and bearing upon the question here involved. In th(~ 
case of IJ!lills v. Embry (Va.), 186 S. E. 47 (June 11, 1936), 
the creator of the trust in question provided a trust as fol-
lows: 
'' * * * For the sole and separate use of the said 1\fable 
Mills, wife of said Joseph Yv. ~fills, for her maintenance 
and support, and that of her children, during the joint lives 
of the said Joseph W. 1\Hlls, and 1\{able 1\Hlls, and upon th~ 
death of the said Joseph W. Mills, for the life of the said 
Mable Mills, or until her remarriage, and upon the death 
or remarriage of the said 1\fable ~fills, which ever may first 
happen, then to be equally divided among the children of 
the said Mable Mills by the said Joseph W. 1\tlills, living at 
the death of the said Mable 1\tiills and to the issue· of any 
children as may ·have died in the lifetime of the said Mable 
Mills.'' 
Shortly after the death of the creator his wife remarried. 
The only child of the creator and Mary Mills claimed that 
his remainder interest accrued at the date of remarriage. 
The trustee claimed it would not accrue until her death. 
The Court held that .although the language used to fix the 
time for possession of the property by the remainderman 
was ambiguous, that looking to the intent of the creator and 
reading the entire instrument it was obvious that ,his pri-
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mary object was to provide for his widow during her widow-
hood and this was all; that this being true the son's enjoyment 
accrued on remarriage, saying: 
''The instrument should be construed as a whole so as to . 
ascertain the general intention of the creator of the trust. 
Where there is manifest a general intent, ·construction should 
be such as to effectuate such intent, though in so doing some 
particular or subordinate intent may be defeated, or the lit~ 
eral import of the words be departed from.'' 
In the present case Mrs. Bottimore states that she never 
intended to place the property beyond her control by way 
of revocation (R., p. 2). The trustee is directed, insofar as 
possible, to hold the 'whole estate free from the debts of Mrs. 
Bottimore. The preamble names as beneficiaries "herself 
and others", "others" fron1 the context being necessarily 
synonymous with ''children'' and under the decision of this 
State (see Wallace v. Dodd's .Ex't·s., 3 Leigh 258), this does 
not confer any interest but only designates the motive. Ar-
ticle II of the Trust Agreement (R., p. 5) provides that the 
trustee ''shall pay the balance or net amount 10f said income 
to trustor during her life. Article III (R., p. 5) provides the · 
net income to be paid to trustor for her maintenance and sup-
port. 
The entire primary purpose of the trust, therefore, it is 
urged, is to create a life estate for trustor (Mrs. Bottimore). 
This is her one idea. If any interests are conferred, they 
are subordinate purposes of th~ creator and should not bH 
allowed to defeat her primary purpose of creating an estate 
for herself. As Justice Hudgins aptly remarked in the Mills 
case, supra: 
''Where there is manifest a general intent, construction 
should be such as to effectuate such intent, though in so doing 
some particular or subordinate intent may be defeated or the 
literal import of the words departed from.'' 
2. Any interest in third persons created by Article ITT is an 
interest in expectancy not to come into being until crea-
tor's death and is not such interest as defeats creator's 
right of revocation. 
There is a conflict among the authorities of the differ-
ent jurisdictions upon this point, but Virginia, as early as 
1920 took a very definite stand on this precise issue in a case 
very an~ogous to the instant case. 
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The case of Russell's Exors. v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, is 
quite leng·thy, but a careful examination of it will give a very 
clear conception of the view of the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals upon the question of the revocability of trusts. 
In this case Passmore, Sr., had made a voluntary parol 
conveyance of stocks to Russel as trustee to be held by Rus-
sel for the benefit of George E. Passmore, Jr., upon Pa..~s­
more, Sr.'s death. (See page 485.) Upon what terms tl1c 
trust was to be held prior to the creator's death was not evi-
dent (page 485). But the stock was unquestionably given to 
Russel and changed to his name on the corporate records. 
Subsequent to this time Passmore attempted to make a 
second trust of the same property and then died. 
The court, page 496, sets out the primary question con-
fronting it, which is precisely the question involved in this 
appeal: 
'' 1. ·Are the facts set out in the bill, and is the evidence 
in the cause, sufficiently unequivocal, explicit, clear and con-
vincing to establish the parol trust alleged in the bill, which 
was for the exclusive benefit of George E. Passmore, Jr.; 
a;nd if so was the interest vested in the latte1· ~"nder that tntst 
as originally created irrevocable by the donor after the crea-
tion of the trust?'' (Italics supplied.) 
The Court after an exhaustive examination of the evidence 
and after an express confirmation of the universal rule that: 
'' • • • A trust once created and accepted without reserva-
tion of power can only be revoked by the full consent of all 
parties in interest; if any of the parties are not in l;>eing, or 
are not sui juris, it cannot be revoked at all." 
then goes on to hold that in a case where the equitable in-
terest vested is to come into a state of en,ioyment not until 
the donor's death that such does not constitute the vesting 
of such interest as will put the interest beyond the donor's 
control for the purpose of revocation and that although upon 
the happening of the event upon which the enjoyment of 
the interest accrues (in this case, the death of the donor) 
the interest will relate back to the date of the instrument so 
as not to be testamentary in character, that the grantor could 
revoke the trust at any time prior to the happenin,q of th~ 
event (death) which transfonned the staf.e of expectancy intrj 
a s~ate of enjoyment. 
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The Court goes further to state very definitely that there 
need be no expres.~ power of revocation reserved in the tr:ust, 
but that such may be implied, saying: 
'' * * * The last cited authority ('Cyc.), at p. 92, does state 
that 'a trust completely created and containing no express 
power of revocation, is not revocable by the creat-or without 
the consent of the beneficiary'. (Italics supplied.) But on 
principle, and· in accordance with the authorities, it is not 
material that the power of revocation be express. If it ex-
ists by necessary implication under the terms of the gift, it 
may be exercised just the same as if expressly reserved. 
This indeed is expressly held in Sterling v. Wilkinson, 83 Va. 
791, 3 S. E. 533. '' 
It is urged that this case is of vital importance in the 
determination of the case at bar. Indeed, the case at bar 
presents a stronger case for revocation than the Passmore 
case, for in the case at bar the creator is herself the bene.;. 
ficiary during· her life and every indication is that the pur-
pose of the trust was to provide for herself, while in the Pass-
more case the creator was not the recipent of any interest 
whatever and, therefore, the presumption would have been 
stronge1· in the Passmore case that the creator had intended 
to part with all title. It will be remembered that as stated 
in the case of BeG!Jn v~ Central Hanover BOAtk & Trust Co., 
248 N. Y. (App. Div.) 183: 
''there is a distinction between cases where the creator makes 
a trust in his own favor and where the primary recipient un-
der the trust is another." 
The soundness of this case has never been questioned in 
this jurisdiction and it 'vould seem that this case is conclusive 
on the issues here presented. Other jurisdictions, however, 
support the same view. 
In Cole v. Nickel (1919), 43 Nev. 12, 177 Pac. 409, writ of 
certiorari denied in (1921) 256 U. S. 222, 65 L. Ed. 900, 41 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 467, the question inyolve_d was whether a deed 
of trust created a vested estate so as to exempt the transfer 
from the operation of a tax statute. It appeared that the 
trustor had executed a will, made a deed of trust, transferring 
certain stock to trustees, which was accepted by them, and 
had procured a transfer of the stock on the books of the 
corporation to the trustees, all of which was held to consti-
tute one transaction. Although the vital point before the 
court related to the right to recover a tax, the court con-
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sidered the revocability of the deed in the following lan-
guage: 
"We see nothing in the deed that could have prevented 
the deceased from revoking; the trust had he desired so to 
do. No beneficiaries or thu·d party, as far as the record 
shows, had any present interest in the property to prevent the 
deceased, if necessary to do so, from invoking a court of 
equity to revoke the trust. The appellants and other ap-
pointees under the will had no such interest, because the 
deceased could have revoked his will and made another in 
favor of other parties. His beneficiaries in the indenture 
had no such interest, because the deceased had power by will 
to secure the property to others, and entirely exclude them 
from all interest therein. * * * It is clear from both instru-
ments that the trustees were not empowered to transfer any 
interest or pay any legacy created by either instrument until 
the death of the grantor. The property was to all intents 
and purposes that of Hetl;ry Miller, subject to the disposition 
made of it by his will published- and declared simultaneously 
with the deed." (Italics supplied.) 
In Frederick's Appeal (1866), 52 Pa. 338, 91 Am. Dec. 159, 
it appeared that the preamble of a deed was as follows: 
"Whereas, I, Philip Nace, Sr., in consequence of certain 
disadvantageous bargains and undertakings, and being old 
and feeble, have met with considerable losses, and being now 
indebted to a considerable amount, have become so much 
troubled in mind as to be incapable of attending properly 
to business, and having reason to fear, if this state of things 
should continue any length of time, that n1y affairs would not 
only fall into confusion, but would be in danger of losing my 
estate; and believing that the transferring of the entire man-
agement of my business to three discreet and reputable per-
sons would spare me much care. and trouble, and save me 
from further losses and destruction of my P!Operty.'' 
By the deed was granted all his real and personal estate, in 
trust, to convert all into money, pay his debts, and invest 
the residue, and from the interest, after deducting necessary 
expenses, to support the grantor during his life and submit 
a statement to him on the first Monday of April in every 
year, and in one year after his death pay the balance, to-
gether with the interest that might then have accrued. Sub-
sequently he executed a deed revoking the earlier deed. As 
to his right to do so the court said: 
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"Now, on the part of the appellant it is maintained that 
the deed was a mere power of attorney, an instrument of. 
agency, and therefore revocable at pleasure, whilst on the 
part of the appellees it is regarded as a voluntary trust, in 
behalf of the children, fully executed by a legal conveyance, 
and therefore to be supported in equity. We are of opinion 
that the deed in question here was made for the grantor's 
own personal convenience; that the trustees were to account 
to him for all they did under the powers vested in them, and 
that no beneficial interest was to vest in his children till after 
his death. A disposition of p1·operty to take elf ect after the 
grantor's death is testa1nenta.ry, and therefore revocable. 
See also Rick's Appeal ( 1884), 105 Pa. 528; -Chestnut Street 
Nat. Bank v. Fidelit~1 Ins. Trust ct S. D. Co. (1898), 186 Pa. 
333, 65 Am. St. Rep. 860, 40 Atl. 486. '' (Italics supplied.) 
Thus, the true rule seems to be that a purely voluntary 
trust deed, intended to promote the convenience and pro-
tect the interests of the grantor, and passing no present in-
terest to third persons may be revoked at will, although it 
contains no power of revocation or even though stipulating 
that the instrument be irrevocable. If such deed provides 
for the benefit of third persons to take effect after t:he grant-
or's death, such provisions are testamentary in nature and 
revocable, or may -be regarded as covenants for posthumou~:; 
gifts, as such, without consideration. Rick's Appeal, 105 
Pa. St. 528. See also note to Bristow v. Tasker, 20 A. S. R. 
862; also Chestnut St. N aJ. Bk. v. Fidelity Ins. Trust and 8. 
D. Co., 186 Penn. 333, and note found in 65 A. S. R. 864. 
The case of Bristow v. Tasker, 135 Pa. St. 110, 20 Am. St. 
· Rep. 853, is very analogous to the instant case. Ifere a trust 
agreement, just as in the instant case, containing no power 
of revocation, executed as in the instant case by a single 
woman and not in contemplation of marriage, conveyed her 
property in trust to pay her the income during life, and at 
her death, in trust for her appointees, or in default of ap-
pointment, in trust for her heirs. It will be noted how simi-
lar these facts are to those in the instant case. The court, 
in holding· this trust revocable at the instance of the gTantor, 
says: 
''By the terms of the deed the grantor's property was all 
conveyed by the cest·ui que fn.tst to the trustee in trust to 
receive the rents, issues, and profits of the real estate, and 
the interest, income, and dividend of the personal estate, and 
pay it all over to the grantor as received, or to let her re-
ceive it directly, during the whole term of her life, ancl after 
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her death, in trust for the use of such persons as she might 
appoint, and on failure of appointment, in trust for her right 
heirs. In such a case as this -we have several times decided 
that the trust is a mere passi'Qe trust, which can be terminated 
at any .time at the 'mere will of cestuli que trust, who 1nay de-
mand a reconveyance of the whole estate fron~ the trustee. 
The reason that she has stttch contt·ol over the trust is, that 
she alone has any ·i·nterest in the trust property, being en-
titled to the whole inco1ne of the estate during her life, with 
a power of absolttte disposal of the corpus of the estate, by 
'tvay of appoVnt'lnent, to any person she may please, and on 
failure of any appovntment, the estate to go to her heirs." 
(Italics supplied.) 
Equally as strong is the case of Chestnut St. Nat. Bank 
v. Fidelity Ins., etc., Co., 186 Penn. St. 333, 65 Am. St. Rep. 
Here a trustor conveyed certain property to be held in trust 
to pay the trustor during life the income and after his death, 
to convey to such of his sons as were living and to the issue · 
of such as had died. The Court tersely sets out the two 
theories presented and decides the issues thus: 
" * * * 'Now on the part of the appellant it is maintained 
that the deed was a mere power of attorney, an instrument 
of agency, and therefore revocable a.t pleasure, whilst upon 
the part of the appellees it is regarded as a voluntary trust 
on behalf of the children fully executed by a legal conveyance 
and therefore to be supported in equity. ~ • • We are of opin-
ion that the deed in question here was made for the grantor's 
own personal convenience, that the trustees were to account 
to him for all they did under the powers vested in them, and 
that no beneficial interest was to vest in his children until 
after his death. A disposition of property to take effect after 
the grantor's death is testamentary, and therefore revoc-
able.' " 
26 R. C. L., Section 49, page 1208, recognizes this principle 
thus: 
,,, * * * If a trust is both voluntary and testamentary in 
character and no immediate interest vests thereunder in any 
beneficiary, it so far resembles a will that it may be revoked 
by the grantor at any time prior to his decease.'' 
citing the above cases in support. It will be recalled that 
these cases are exactly in line with the type interest con-
ferred under the instrument here in question and is in per-
14 S-qpreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
feet accord and harmony with the doctrine of the Virginia 
Court as laid down in the Passntore case, supra. We are 
frank to say that we can see no question as to the nature 
of the interests-if any-conferred in this trust agreement. 
They cannot come into enjoyment until the death of tl).e trus-
tor, Mrs. Bottimore, intestate. 
Before leaving this rule, however, it is important that this 
class of cases b~ definitely distinguished from those trusts 
where the intere.sts conveyed are not of "testamentary na-
ture'' as here, but are ''testamentary dispositions proper''. 
In the latter class of cases, the trust is void unless the in-
strument conforms with the formal requisites of the statute 
of wills. As the learned authors of the ''Restatement of 
Trusts'' express the rule in Vol. 1, page 167: 
''Where the owner of property purports to create a trust 
inter vivos but no interest passes to the beneficiary before 
the death of the settlor, the intended trust is a testamentary 
· trust and is invalid unless the requirements of the statutes re-
lating to the validity of wills are complied with.'' 
. I 
In the case above discussed, however, the interest is of 
testamentary character in thaiJ its enjoyment doesn't accrue 
until the death of the creator, but if such death occurs (be-
fore revocation) the trust is valid as the interest relates back 
to the date of its creation. Such interest, nevertheless, is of 
testamentary nature and does not bar revocation by the crea-
tor. This latter is the precise type of disposition in the case 
at bar and in the Passmore case, supra, which the court de-
fined as follows: 
''A valid equitable assignment may, of course, be con-
ditional. And if the condition be a subsequent condition, al-
though it has power to divest the equitable title to the gift, 
yet if that condition does not arise, the title, by relation, is 
regarded as complete .and absolute from the time of the gift. 
And when such condition involves a possible revocation of 
the gift by the donor in his lifetime, on his death without 
having exercised such powe·r, upon the same principle as that 
which is involved in gifts oausa mortis (Basket v. Hassell, 
supra), the equitable title does not await until after the death 
of the donor to pass to the beneficiary, so as to become a 
testan1entary disposition, but is regarded as having passed 
in the lifetime of the donor at the time of the gift-where 
the gift is in proper form to be effectual, as, of course, is un-
questionably true where possession of the subject of the gift 
+ 
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is given by the donor to a trustee who accepts the trust, all 
in the lifetime of the donor." (Italics sup:plied.) 
3. ·Any interest in this tntst other than Creator's is to be 
taken on donor's death by descent an'd not by purchase. 
It will be observed that in the trust agreement here in 
question the named persons under paragraph IV are crea-
tor's only possible heirs or next-of-kin. She had neither 
father, mother nor brothers and only the sisters named at 
the time of the creation of the trust. She was unmarried, 
but even though shP. had had a husbanc:L he would not have 
been an heir or next-of-kin. He would have had an interest as 
distributee and a right given hini by statute, Section 5276 
to demand a fixed proportion of his wife's estate. There-
fore, paragraph IV is the same as if the designation had been 
heirs or next-of-kin instead of naming them. 
We have been unable to find a situation similar to that 
presented in the instant case where revocation has not been 
allowed. We quote from "Restatement of Trusts" not be.., 
cause it upholds our position, but because it is the most re-
cent culling and summation by recognized leading legal minds, 
the American Law Institute, of the controlling rules on the 
points covered. At Volume 2, page 1038, it is stated on the 
proposition that a trustor being sole beneficiary may revoke 
the trust: 
''The rule stated in this Section is applicable although the 
settlor does not reserve a power of revocation, and even 
thoug·h it is provided in specific words by the terms of the 
trust that the trust shall be irrevocable. It is applicable al-
though the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust was 
to prevent himself from mismanaging the property.'' 
As an illustration of this rule the authors select a very 
analogous situation to that presented in th~ case at bar, 
thus: 
''A transfers property to B in trust to pay the income to 
A for life and on A's death to pay the principal as A may by 
deed or by will appoint and in default of appointment to A's 
heirs or next of kin. A reserves no power of revocation. A 
can compel B to transfer the property to him.'' 
As to when the settlor is the sole beneficiary the authors in 
Vol. 1, pages 320, 321, state : · 
l 
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''When settlor is sole beneficia,ry. Where the owner of 
property transfers it in trust to pay the income to himself 
for a period of years and at the expiration of the period to. 
pay the principal to hhn, he is the sole beneficiary of the trust. 
The settlor is likewise the sole beneficiary where he trans-
fers property in trust to pay the income to himself for life 
and on his death to pay the principal to his estate. So also, 
the settlor is sole beneficiary where he transfers property in 
trust to pay the incon1e to him for life and upon his death 
to convey the principal as he may by deed or by will appoint, 
although it is provided that in default of appointment the 
property shall be conveyed to his heirs or next of kin.'' 
And as an example: 
''.A transfers property to B in trust to pay the income to 
A for life and on A's death to pay the principal as A may 
by deed or by will appoint and in default of appointment to 
A's heirs or next of kin. A is the sole beneficiary of the 
trust.'' 
Nor does the fact that the power to convey by "deed" is 
omitted alter this rule. Thus the authors state: 
" * * * If it is provided by the terms of the trust that the 
income shall be paid to him for life and that upon his death 
the principal shall be paid as he may by will appoint and in 
default of appointment to his heirs or next of kin, the fact 
that he has omitted to reserve a power to appoint in any way 
except by 'viii is so1ne indication that he intended to make 
his heirs or next of kin beneficiaries of the trust and to con-
fer an interest upon them of which they cannot be deprived 
except by a testamentary appointment; b'ltt it is not of itself 
sufficient to overcome the inference that he intended to be 
sole beneficiary of the trust.'' (Italics supplied.) 
A review of. a few of the authorities show the soundness 
of this rule. 
In Aranyi v. Bankers Tntst Co. (1922), 201 App. Div. 706, 
194 N. Y. Supp. 614, it appeared that the plaintiff had en-
tered into a trust agreement with the defendant, 'vhereby 
she transferred to the defendant all right, title and interest 
which she then had, or might at any time thereafter have, in 
the corpus of a trust fund established under the 'will of the 
plaintiff's grandfather, for the benefit of the plaintiff's 
mother during her lifetime, with remainder over to her issue~ 
The trust provided, in substance, that when said distributive 
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share was. received by the defendant it should be held by it 
in trust, the net income to be paid o~er to the plaintiff from 
time to time, she having the privilege of withdrawing certain 
instalments of principal at various times therein specified, 
the trust to terminate on the plaintiff arriving at the age 
of thirty-five years, at which time the defendant was to con-
·vey and pay over the balance of the· principal of the said 
trust fund to the plaintiff for her own use and benefit for-
ever. In case of the death of the plaintiff before arriving 
at the age of thirty-five years, then the defendant was to con- · 
vey, transfer, and pay over the principal of the trust fund, 
or such portion thereof as might remain in its hands, in 
equal shares to the children of the plaintiff then living; and 
if the plaintiff should die before attaining the age of thirty-
. five years, without leaving children her surviving, then on her 
death the defendant was to convey, transfer, and pay over the 
said fund to such person or corporation as the plaintiff should 
appoint by her last will and testament. The plaintiff in the 
agreement declared the same to be irrevocable. The court 
said: 
''In the case under consideration the trust was created for 
the benefit of the creator, to hold her property in trust for 
her benefit until she should arrive at the age of thirty-five 
years, when· it was to be paid over to her. Her children were 
not in any sense to be beneficiaries of the trust. Their only 
possibility of interest would be in case she should die prior 
to the termination of the trust period, leaving such children. 
The trust deed as to them was testamentary in character. 
The learned counsel for the appellant has failed to distin-
guish, in his citation of authorities, between trusts created 
in real estate and those where the corpus is personalty. While 
in this case the trust deed refers to both real and personal 
property, it is only as to the trust in the personalty that 
revocation is sought. I mn of opinion that where the corpus 
of the trust is personal property, and the trust is a voluntary 
on-e made by the creator for her ow-n benefit, and she is the 
only person in being having a vested or contingent interest 
therein, she has the right to revoke the same." (Italics sup-
plied.) 
In Schwartz v. Fulton Trust Co. (1922), 119 Misc. 831, 198 
N. Y. Supp. 275, it appeared that the deed of trust which it 
was sought to have revoked was created by the plaintiff her-
self as the settlor for her own life, and its beneficiaries after 
her death were to be designees, whom she might by will ap-
point, and, in default of such designation, the person who 
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would take if she died intestate under New York law. It 
was declared in the deed that the trust was irrevocable. The 
court, in holding that the settlor could terminate the trust, 
said: 
''Her declaration in the deed that she deemed the trust 
irrevocable did not prevent her fron1 making.· a revocation,. 
as the law but requires the consent of all persons beneficially 
interested to consent to a revocation in order to make the 
termination of a trust effective, and whether a settlor de-
clares a deed of trust irrevocable or not, the combined con-
sent of all who have a beneficial interest will revoke the ap-
parent irrevocability. * * * While the declaration asserts a 
vesting of interest, if what is attempted to be granted and 
conveyed is not an estate recognized by the laws regulating 
personal property in this state, there can be no vested or 
contingent estate transferred, and hence no beneficial inter-
est. Estates are either those in possession or in expectancy. 
Obviously, this proposed grant is that of the latter class. It 
is pu.rposed to 'make the grant contingent 'ttpon the happen-
ing of an event, to-~vit, the clea.th of the settlor ~thou,t a 
designation of appointees to take the corpus. The terms of 
the instrument grant nothing more than the law would give 
if the same contingency should eventuate, because the per-
sonal property, on the death of the settlor, would be dis-
tributed among her next of kin according to New York law, 
in the absence of a testamentary disposition or appointment. 
These persons, whoever they may be at death, have no more 
interest now than they had without this instrument. They 
1nay be defeated by a will under the instrument. * * * I hold 
that the settlor can terminate the trust.'' (Italics supplied.) 
In Whitte·more v. Equitable Trust Co. (1914), 162 App. 
Div. 607, 147 .N. Y. Supp. 1058, the right to revoke was recog-
nized where an agreement was executed in writing, under 
seal and duly acknowledged, whereby the plaintiff assigned 
and transferred to a trust company certain securities on trust 
to pay the net income to the plaintiff, or to apply the same 
to her use, so long as she should live, and to pay over to 
her, or apply to her use, such portion of the principal "as 
may, in the opinion of the party of the second part, be. neces-
sary for the support of the party of the first part, in addi-
tion to such income and profits, and upon her death to dis-
tribute the principal of said trust fund then remaining un-
disposed of hereunder among her next of kin''. The trust 
company was expressly authorized to sell all or any part 
of the securities and invest the proceeds, and, in so doing, 
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to exercise its own discretion without reference to any law 
regulating the investments of trustees, and to deduct from 
the income or principal its reasonable expenses and disburse-
ments and its compensation, the rate of which was therein 
prescribed. The deed of trust contained no express reserva-
tion of power of revocation. It was held that the agreement 
did not create any interest in the next of kin which ren-
dered their consent necessary to a revocation of the trust. 
The court said: 
''The learned counsel contends that the consent of the 
brother and sister of the plaintiff to the revocation of the 
trust is necessary, for. the reason that if the trust were pres-
ently terminated by the death of. the plaintiff they would be 
her next of kin and entitled to take the remainder. The 
theory on which this argument 'is based, according to the 
submission, is that the brother and sister now have a bene-
ficial interest in the deed of trust, and, according t~ the brief, 
that they have a contingent interest in the remainder. • • w 
· It is quite evident, I think, tha.t the plaintiff did not· inte-nd 
by this deed of trust to give those ~vho will be her next of kin 
at the ti1ne of her death a present beneficial interest in the 
prope1·ty. She merely intended to t~trn over the management 
of her securities to the trust company fo·r he·r own benefit, 
and to relieve her of the responsibility of lo'okin_q after them, 
collecting the inco'me, sellin,q 111hen advisable, and reinvest-
ing. She reserved to herself, w~th the CONSENT of the trus-
tee; the right to use the enti1·e property, if necessary. It is, 
therefore, manifest that her sole object in creating the trust 
was to provide for her own necessities and comfort during 
life. It is true the deed of trust contains the provision that 
the trustee shall upon her death distribute the principal of 
the trust fund then remaining among her next of kin; but 
I think no particular significance is to be attached to that pro-
vision. It may have been thought that without some pro-
vision of the kind. the trust company 'vould take the re-
maindeJ.~; and the provision, I think, was inserted merely as 
a direction to the trust company with respect to disposing 
of the property after her death, and she directed that it be 
distributed as the law provides for the distribution of the 
property of an intestate. • • • It follows that the plaintiff 
is entitled to judgment revoking the deed of trust and di-
recting defendant to deliver to her the securities and the ptu-
ceeds and accumulations thereof in its possession, upon pay-
ment of its lawful commissions and expenses.'' See also 
Cruger v. Union Tr1~Jst Co. (1916}, 173 App. Div:. 797, 160 N. 
Y. Supp. 480. (Italics supplied.) · · · 
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In Stephens v. Moore (1923), 298 Mo. 215, 249 S. W. 601, 
it appeared that the plaintiff had on his twenty-first birth-
day executed a trust deed of property which he had inherited 
from his father. By the terms of the deed the trustee was 
"to have and to hold 'the real estate and personal property 
aforesaid for my sole use and benefit'', on certain specified 
terms and conditions. It also provi'ded: "Upon my death 
this trust shall terminate and the trust shall pass to and vest 
in my legal heirs, or as may be directed in my will.'' The 
powers conferred on the trustee were comprehended in the 
following language : . 
"My trustee- shall have complete control, supervision, and 
management of my said property, both real and personal, and 
• • • it shall be his duty at all times to keep said lands rented 
on the best terms obtainable, to reliable and trustworthy ten-
ants, and to see that same are cultivated and used in a hus-
. band-like manner, to the end that the same shall not de-
teriorate in value or be wasted by improper or improvident 
cultivation; to. keep up the fences, buildings, and other im- · 
provements thereon; to keep the buildings 'reasonably in-
sured, and pay all taxes thereon as they become due ; to keep 
all of my said moneys and other personal estate hereby con-
veyed or hereinafter inherited or acquired safely and securely 
invested; to pay · all taxes thereon, and, not less than once 
each year, pay over to me the net proceeds from my said lands 
and personal estate and property up to the date of such pay-
ments.'' · 
It was held that the trustee did n.ot take t~e fee, that the 
grantor was the sole beneficiary 1tnder the trust, that no other 
person had any interest in the tr1u;:t estate, and that the 
grantor had the right to revoke the tntst. The court said: 
''The words 'and the trust shall pass to and vest . in my 
legal heirs, or as may be directed in my will', is a mere 
statement, by way of further limitation of the trustee's es-
tate, that the grantor reserves full authority to dispose of the 
reversion as he sees fit. In view of the foregoing considera-
tions, we conclude that the appellant is the sole beneficiary 
under the trust and that no other person has any interest 
in the trust estate, contingent or other- * * * The deed cre-
ating it purports to be a conveyance in trust of the grantor's 
property, not' coupled with any interest, but solely for the pur-
pose of supervision and management. It gives the trustee 
no power over the property except the management of it. 
• • • These rights and powers, while granted by an instru-
E. R. Bottimore v. First & Merchants Natl. Bank, et als. 21 
ment in the form of a conveyance in trust, could have been 
just as effectually· conferred by the ordinary power of at-
torney. The dootrine is universal that a trustee takes ex-
actly that quantity of interest, whatever it may be, which 
the purpose of the trust and its proper execution may re-
quire, and no more. * * * The deed here should therefore be 
reg·arded as investing the gTantee ·merely with the powers 
of an agent, and, as the grant was not coupled with an in-. 
terest nor supported by an independent consideration, such 
powers would be revocable at the pleasut-e of the grantor.'' 
In the very late case of Sequin State Ban.k & Trust. Co., et 
al. v. Locke, et als., 102 S. W. (2nd) 1050, decided by the 
Court of Appeals of Texas on March 17, 1937, the Court 
says: 
''There are numerous cases to the effect that instruments, 
whether in the form of deeds or trust agreements, where a 
grantor devolves the legal title upon a trustee solely for the 
use and benefit of the grantor, even for. the natural life of 
·such grantor, with a provision th3:t upon his death the prop-
erty shall pass to and vest in his legal heirs, or as directed 
in his will, the trustee does not take the fee, and the agree-
ment is subject to revocation at the will of the grantor. In 
such a case the grantor retains the beneficial title, with right 
of reversion, and, upon termination of the trust by death, 
the heirs take by inheritance or bequest and not by pur-
chase.'' 
4. Fonn and Lan.guage of Instru1nent itself corrob'orate in-
tention of creato·r not to pass title out of herself: 
As heretofore shown, the creator, Mrs. Bottimore, has al-
leged in her bill of complaint that it was her intention to 
make herself sole beneficiary under this trust and we have 
endeavored in the foregoing discussion· of authorities to show 
that the provisions of the instrument itself are in accord with 
such intention. We believe further, however, that the very· 
form of the instrun1ent itself clearly corroborates the alleged 
intention of the creator. Indeed it is urged that under the 
form of the instrument no other position could be maintained. 
An examination of the instrument purporting to be the em-
bodiment of the trust agreement in the instant _case reveals 
these· deficiencies : 
1. There is no language present which divests the trustor 
of any interest or which could, under any rules of convey-
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ancing, even the most literally construed, transfer any legal 
or equitable title to the trustee. · 
2. The instrument is not acknowledged and not capable 
of recordation, which has been held in Virginia even as to 
transfer of title to chattels to a trustee, if not vitally neces-
sary, at least very advisable to the effecting of such '' deliv-
ery'' and "transfer of title and interest" as. is necessary to 
the validity of a trust. Hall v. Ilall, 109 Va. 117. 
3. There is apparently no proper ''identification'' of the 
property subject to •the trust. The instrument itself is wholly 
executory in its nature and speaks of the future application 
of "certain'' securities "when identified". No identification 
ever appears to have been made. The bank, it is true, is now 
handling c~rtain securities for Mrs. Bottimore under this 
so-called trust agreement, but there is no identification which 
we have been able to find tying in these sec uri ties as those 
mentioned in the trust agreement . 
.An examinatio~, of a few excerpts from recognized authori.; 
ties will disclose that this trust agreement is hopelessly de-
ficient as an irre·vocable trust, though good so long as it lasts 
as a revocable trust in the following particulars : 
1. There has been no passing of title or interest from out 
of the g:r;antor into the trustee. 
2. There has been no identification of the trust res in any 
manner, either expressly or by reference. 
3. There is no acknowledgment to the instrument, nor any 
habendum clause of any nature and though an acknowledg-
ment might not be vital to the validity of the trust as between 
the parties, yet its absence necessitates some other strong 
evidence of divesting of title on the part of the grantor 
which is ·lacking in the instant case. · 
The general rule is that an ·essential element to the ex-
istence of an irreyocable trust is the divesting of the crea-
tor of all title and interest and the vesting of such in the trus-
·tee. That such was not consummated in the instant case is 
clear. · 
The authors of the work of Resta.tement of the Law of 
Trusts, released June 13, 1935, state the applicable rule as 
follows: · 
''Intention to transfer. If the owner of property surren-
der possession of the subject matter or of a deed of gift 
which would be otherwise sufficient to transfer the property, 
but he does not manifest an intention to make a present 
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transfer of the property, there is no present transfer of the 
property and no trust is created, although the owner in~ 
tended that when the transfer should be made the transferee 
should hold the property in trust.'' 
Bogart, in his latest work on the subject, states the rule 
thus: 
"What acts the settlor must perform in order to vest the 
desired property interest in the trustee, is a question of the 
law of conveyancing. In the case of interests in land, a deed 
will be needed; and possibly also a seal and appropriate ac-
knowledgment or attestation, where tangible personal prop-
erty is involved, if the transfer is gratuitous, a deed of gift 
_ or delivery will be a requisite. If the res is to' be intangible 
personalty, the safest method of transfer will be by d~.ed with 
delivery of the document representing the chose in action, if 
there is such document. 
''The discussion here is confined to the conveyancing ne-
cessities for irrevocable assig'Illllent of choses in action to 
trustees or absolute donees. Even though there is no writ-
ing or delivery of a token of the chose, there may be a rev-
ocable transfer without consideration so that the obligor 
on the chose will be obliged to pay to the assignee until 
revocation, but such assignments are of relative unimpor-
tance in the creation of trusts. '' 
Again the. authors of Restatem.ent of Law of Trusts, at page 
104, say: 
"If the owner of property intend to make a gratuitous 
transfer of the property in trust, put the title to the prop-
erty does not pass to the interested trustee because the trans-
fer is incomplete for want of delivery of the subject matter 
or for want of delivery of a deed of co·nveyance, no trust is 
created and the title to the property remains in. the owner 
free of trust.'' 
In 65 0. J., page 310, Section 75, the rule is_ expressed 
thus: · 
''Where another than the donor is selected as trustee of a 
voluntary trust, there must be such a delivery of the prop-
erty as constitutes a relinquishment of dominion over the 
property by the donor and as will be eff ect,ual to transfer the 
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~egal title. * * • In other words, in general, it is necessary and 
sufficient that the creator· should have d;one e·verything which · 
co·uld have been done, the character of the property compris-
ing the trust being considered, to tr~nsfer the property to 
the trustee in s·uch nwde as will be effectual to pass title." 
(Italics supplied). 
26 R. C. L., 1193, is even more stringent in the rule adopted : 
"A voluntary trust is an equitable gi.ft, and like a legal 
gift must be complete. * * * The interest of the grantor in 
the property is terminated by the ex·ecution of a deed of per-
sonal estate in trust, i.ts acknowledgtnent for registry, and 
delivery by the grantor to one of the trustees and its ac .. 
ceptance by him withou,t condition. The legal consequence 
of these acts is to operate a complete divestive of the grantor's 
title to the property conveyed, and to invest it in the grantees, 
upon the trusts and for the uses declared by the deed.'' 
The case of lVadd v. Hazelton, 137 N. Y. 215, in holding 
that the intention to· divest oneself of property even though 
re.duced to writing is utterly ineffectual to pass title saying: 
''The settler must either transfer the property to a trustee 
or declare that he holds it himself in trust. An intention to 
give, evidenced in writing, 1nay be most satisfactorily es-
tablished and yet the intended gift may fail because no de-
livery is proved.'' 
In the instant case there is nowhere to be found any list 
of securities conveyed or to be conveyed under the trust in-
strument. 
As heretofore mentioned, the record fails to sho'v where 
there has been any designation of trust property. The mere 
fact that Mrs. Bottimore, at some time subsequent to the sign-
ing of the instrument, turned over to the Bank a number of 
securities is of no help unless such securities, by a writing 
or some other express designation, were identified as the 
securities intended to be placed in trust by the creator. 
'&Restatements" at page 82, expresses the rule thus: 
''Where the t·rust property is later t,o~ be designated by the 
settlor. If the owner of property executes an instrument 
purporting to transfer to another in trust such property as 
he may designate thereafter, the conveyance is incomplete 
and no trust arises unless and until he designates the prop-
erty.'' 
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See also 1 Bogart, page 350. 
See also 65 C. J ., page 27~, Section 51 ( 2). 
Of course, it is not questioned that as far as the trust status 
of the parties are concerned, the transaction created a per-
fectly good revocable trust-See 1 Bogart, page 412, and as 
~ar as the administration of the trust up to date is concerned, 
as a revocable trust, it has been perfectly proper. But when 
the trust is attempted to be upheld against the wish of all 
living beneficiaries as an irre~vocable trust an entirely different 
problem is presented. The trust must then meet strict 
criterions of creation which are immaterial to the validity 
of a revocable trust. 
CONCLUS~ON. 
The facts presented in the insta.nt case are not complex. 
As disclosed by the record all parties, whether legally or 
sympathetically interested, are anxious that this trust be 
abrogated and it would certainly seem that where every pre-
sumption of the law favo1·s tho position here ·shown to be 
maintained on behalf of the petitioner that if the Court enter-
tains a doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
appellant. In closing we deem quite significant the following 
expression of Justice Dorc of the N e'v ·York Supreme Court 
concurring in the opinion in the case of Beam v. Central H~ 
over Ba;nlc & T·r'u.st !Co., 248 N. Y. Appel. Div. 183, decided 
in ]\fay, 1936 : 
'"l~he heirs at law in this case acquired through the trust 
instrument no estate at all, at most an expectancy, more ac-
curately a mere hope, .~pes succ:essionis (Matter of Parsons, 
L. R. 45, Ch. Div. 5, 55), which may be barred by will. In 
solving the question whether there is amy rem.ainder, a dis-
tinction 'must be m.ade between gifts to tlw heirs of the holder 
of a partic~tla.r estate and gifts to the heirs of the· granrto,r. 
'A man ca.nnot either by conveyance at the common law, by 
limitation of uses, or devise, make his rig·ht heir a purchaser.' 
(Pibus v. Mitford, (1674) 1 Vent. 372). This principle was 
quoted with approval in .Doctor v. H11.ghe.~ (225 N. Y. 305, 
311, 312), in which the Court of Appeals said: 'The reserva-
tion of a reversion is not inconsistent with the creation of a 
trn~t t·o continue until the death of the reversioner (citing 
cases). We do not say that the ancient rule survives as an 
absolute prohibition limiting the power of a grantor. * • * 
But at least the an.cient ·rule su,rvit'e8 to this extent, that to, 
transf:onn into a rernainder what would oriltinariZy be a re-
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version, the intention to 'WO·rk the transfonnation must be. 
clearly ea;pressed.' " (Italics supplied). 
. In view of the en·ors so committed by the trial court here-
inbefore complained of your petitioner respectfully prays 
that she may be granted an appeal from the decree complained 
of and that the same may be set aside and annulled and final 
judgment entered in this court in favor of your petitioner 
which she deems proper for reasons herein assigned. 
Your petitioner certifies that a copy of this petition and 
brief was duly delivered to counsel for the defendant. The 
First and Merchants National Bank of Richmond, on tlte 
15th day of October, 1937, and that on the same day a copy 
thereof was mailed to the other defendants, they not being rep-
resented by counsel. Your petitioner prays that her counsel 
may be permitted to present this application for an appeal 
orally to the Court or -to some Justice thereof and that an 
oral hearing may be permitted. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
ELIZABETH ROLLER BOTTIMORE, 
By Counsel. 
ALEXANDER H. SA..."N"DS, 
ALEXANDER H. SANDS, JR., 
· Attys. 
'f 
We, the undersigned, practicing attorneys in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our opinion 
the decree complained of in the foregoing petition should be 
reviewed. 
Given under our hands this 15th day of October, 1937. 
ALEXANDER H. SANDS, 
ALEXANDER H. SANDS, JR. 
Received October 15, 1937. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Appeal granted. Supersedeas awarded. Bond $500. 
Oct. 19/1937. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Received Oct~ 19, 1937. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable ]Prank T. Sutton, Jr., Judge 
of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
Two, held for the said city at the courtroom thereof in the 
City Hall on the 27th day of May, 1937. · 
Be It Remembered that heretofore, to-wit: On the 4th 
. day of March, 1936: Came Elizabeth Roller Bottimore, by 
counsel, and filed her Bill of Complaint against The First and 
Merchants National Bank of Richmond, (Mrs.) Wilf.rid Pyle, 
(Miss) Lucy Roller, {Mrs.) Frances R. Grattan, and (Mrs.) 
Margaret S. Ogilvie, which Bill of Complaint and the Ex-
hibit filed therewith are in the words and figures following, 
to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part IT. 
Eliza heth Roller Bottimore, 
v. 
The First & 1\{erchants National Bank of Richmond: (Mrs.) 
Wilfrid Pyle : (Miss) Lucy Roller: (Mrs.) Frances R. Grat-
tan: (Mrs.) 1\'Iargaret. S. Ogilvie. 
To the Hon. ·F'rank T. Sutton,. Judge: 
Your petitioner, Elizabeth Roller Bottimore, respectfully 
presents unto the Court tJte following: · 
Fit·st: That on the seventeenth day of December, 1927, 
being at th~ time· unmarried, your petitioner, did enter into a 
certain trust agreement, a copy of which is· hereto 
page 2 } attached, marked exhibit ''A'' and which is prayed 
to be considered as a part of this petition, under 
the terms of which she conveyed over to the First & Merchants 
National Bank of. Richmond, as trustee, certain cash and 
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securities to be held in trust for her sole benefit during her 
life and upon her death to be distributed as she should in-
dicate by will and in the event she died intestate or upon 
her failure to dispose of said cash and securities by will, to 
be distributed in such manner as provided under the terms 
of the trust agreement. 
·Second: That under the terms of this agreement there 
eXists no interest in any person other than your petitioner such 
as to impair or affect in any way your petitioner's right of 
revocation of the same. 
· Third: That for reasons not pertinent to the issue here 
involved, your petitioner is desirous of having this trust 
ag-reement so revoked that. neither she nor the First & Mer-
chants National Bank of Richmond will be any longer bound 
by the terms thereof. 
Fourth: Your petitioner avers that she is advised and be-
lieves that she is the sole interested party in the trust agree-
ment hereinbefore mentioned. Your petitioner has, however, 
four sisters, all of whom were living at the time the said 
agreement was entered into and who now so "live, two of whom, 
(Mrs.) Wilfrid Pyle, and (Miss) Lucy Roller, are her full 
sisters and two, Mrs. Frances R. Grattan and (Mrs.) Mar-
garet S. Ogilvie are her half sisters; that the petitioner has 
no children and the said sisters beforementioned are the only 
persons mentioned in the trust now in being. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that the First & 
Merchants National Bank of Richmond, (Mrs.) Wilfrid Pyle, 
(Miss) Lucy Roller, (Mrs.) Frances R. Grattan and (Mrs.) 
~Iargaret S. Ogilvie be made parties defendant to this suit, 
that proper process· may issue, that the said defendants be 
required to answer this petition, but not under oath, 
page 3 }- ans,ver under oath being hereby waived; that the 
court by proper decree declare the said trust agree-
ment, so entered into between the petitioner and the afore-
said bank, lawfully revoked and cancelled, and that all of 
the parties thereto be released and discharged from all fur-
ther performance of their respective duties thereunder; and 
for all such other further and general relief as may be proper 
and requisite for her in the premises. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
ELIZABETH ROLLER BOTTIMORE, 
By AI.JEX.ANDER H. SANDS & 
ALEXANDER H. SANDS, JR., 
Counsel. 
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page 4 ~ EXHIBIT'' A''. 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT made this 17th day of De-
cember 1927, between Elizabeth H. Roller, of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, son1etin1es hereinafter referred to as the Trustor, and 
First and Merchants National Bank of Richmond, herein-
after sometimes referred to as the Trustee. 
lVI'fNESE:tH as follows: 
WHEREAS the Trustor is· desirous of creating a trust 
fund for the benefit of herself and others, and, for this pur-
pose, proposes to deliver hereafter certain cash and securi-
ties to the Trustee, to be held and disposed of in accordance 
with the terms of this agreement ; and 
WHEREAS the Trustor desires that said cash and/or se-
curities, hereinafter sometimes referred to and described as 
the Trust Fund, be held· and invested and the income and 
principal thereof disposed of on the terms set out in this agree-
ment; and 
. WHEREAS the Trustee has indicated its willingness to 
undertake the Trust hereby created_; · 
NOW, ~f.1HF~REFORE, it is agreed between the parties 
hereto that said Trust Fund, wl1en delivered to the Trustee 
properly identified, shall be held and invested and the income 
and principal thereof disposed of on the following· trusts and 
no others: 
_ ARTICLE I. The Trustee shall invest the Trust Fund as 
it deems best, without being restricted to those securities ex-
pressly approved by law for investment by fiduciaries, and, 
with absolute and unco~trolled discretion, to s~ll, mortgage, 
exchange or otherwise dispose of all or any parts of the prop-
erty pnder its control, real or personal, and with similar dis-
cretion and freedom from restriction, to resell and to reinvest 
and to change investments from realty to personalty, and 
t'ice >versa; and it is empowered to execute any instrument 
. necessary to carry out the powers conferred, by this 
page 5 ~ agreement, and no purchaser shall be required to 
see to the application of the purchase money. The 
Trustee is also empowered, when in its discretion it is an-
visable to do so, to borrow money, to hypothecate any securi-
ties purchased by it, to enter into obligations (including leases 
and mortgages of real estate) for any length of time, regard-
less of the life of the trust herein created, for any purpose 
it deems necessary for the conduct of the trust, including the 
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raising· of funds, and it is in no way to be held liable for errors 
of judgment committed by it. 
ARTICLE II. The Trustee shall collect and receive all 
rents, issues and income from the Trust Fund and pay from 
said i~come all taxes, fees and other expenses properly charge-
able thereon, and also all current taxes, fees and other ex-
penses incident and properly eha.rgeable to the upkeep of the 
corpus of the Trust Fund (but not taxes or other charges in-
curred on profits accruing to the corpus of the Trust Fund, 
which shall be paid out of those profits) and shall pay the 
balance or net amount of said income to the Trustor during 
her life . 
.ARTICLE III. It is agreed, as a condition of this Trust 
Agreement, that the net income from the Trust Fund shall 
be paid by the Trustee to the Trustor for her maintenance 
and support and that so far as iS' permitted by law neither 
the corpus nor income of the Trust Fund shall be subject to 
the liabilities of the Trustor or to alienation by her and the 
Trustee is directed to take such legal steps as may be requisite 
to prevent such charge or alienation. 
ARTICLE IV. On the death of the Trustor the corpus 
and accumulated income, if any, of the Trust Fund shall pass 
as the Trustor shall direct by will, and, if the Trustor shall 
die intestate as to the Trust Fund, it shall be divided among 
her children who survive her and the lawful issue, per stirpes, 
of those children who predecease the Trustor leaving such 
issue who survive her, but t.he shares or parts of 
page 6 }- shares of all minor beneficiaries shall be held by 
the Trustee who shall expend on the several minor 
beneficiaries the net income and so much of the corpus of their 
respective shares or parts of shares as the Trustee in its 
absolute discretion shall deem necessary for their mainte-
nance, support and/or education ancljor for any emergency 
sufficient in the opinion of the Trustee to warrant such ac-
tion, until ench :;hall in turn reach the age of twenty-one years, 
when the corpus or so much as remains thereof shall be paid 
over outright and free of all trusts. The shares of any of 
the children of the Trustor ·who take under this Article but 
die before becoming hventy-one years of age,_ unmarried and 
without lawful issue, shall revert to the Trust Fund and pass 
under the terms of this agreement. If, however, there be a 
'vidow, or wido"rer, and/or lawful issue surviving, the said 
shares shall pass according to the provic:;ions of the Virg·inia 
Statutes for Descents and Distribution as then in effect. If 
the· Trustor shall die intestate and 'vithout leaving lawful 
issue who survive her, then whatever. remains of the Trust 
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Fund shall be equally divided among those sisters of the 
Grantor who survive her and the lawful issue, per stirpes, 
of those sisters who predecease her leaving lawful issue who 
survive her, absolutely und free of all trusts. 
ARTICLE V. In the event. that at any time during the 
life of the Trustor the Trustee deems it advisable or neces-
sary because of any unusual emergency or sickness sufficient 
to warrant such action, the Trustee shall have the authority 
and shall expend for the bene~.t of the Trustor or any of her 
childrcm such portion of the corpus of the Trust Fund as the 
Trustee Ehall deem nec•?ssary and proper in its sole discre-
tion, and any such expenditure shall be charged against the 
corpus of the Trust ·Fund as a whole- and not against any in- · 
dividual share therein. · 
ARTICLE VI. This Agreement shall be irrevocable by the 
Trustor. 
. ARTICLE VII. If any person shall desire to 
page 7 ~ add to the Trust Fund hei·ein created, the Trus-
tee shall receive all additons which are conveyed 
and/or delivered to it properly designated as a part of said 
Trust Fund, and it shall hold, invest and dispose of the in-
come and corpus thereof ·in the same manner and on the 
same terms as are provided for said Trust Fund. 
ARTICLE VIII. As compensation for its services as Trus-
tee First and 1\tierchants National Bank of Richmond shall 
receive a commission of five per centum (5%) of the annual 
gross income of the Trust Fund, and, on the death of the 
Trustor, if the Trustor shall die intestate the Trustee shall 
receive a further commission of two and one half per centum 
(2-1/2%) of the corpus of the Trust Fund. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF Elizabeth H. Roller has here-
unto set her hand and seal and First a.nd Merchants N a-
tiona! Bank of Richmond has caused these presents to be 
executed on its behalf by its duly authorized officers and its 
corporate seal affixed, all having been done in duplicate as of 
the day and year first above written. 
By 
Attest . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Seal) 
FIRST AND MERCHANTS NATIONAL 
BANK OF RICHMOND, 
...................................... 
Vice-President. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Asst. Trust Officer. 
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page 8 r And thereafter on the same day, to-wit: at a 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, held the 4th day of March, 1936: · 
This day came Elizabeth Roller Bottimore, by counsel, 
and. by leave of court filed her petition with accompanying 
exhibit, and came also the defendants, The First and M'"er-
chants National Bank of Richmond, (Mrs.) Wilfrid Pyle, 
(Miss) Lucy Roller, (Mrs.) F;rances R. Grattan and (Mrs.) 
Margaret S. Ogilvie, by counsel, who by like leave filed their 
respective answers to said petition, to which answers the 
pHtintiff replied not, whereupon the cause is ordered to be 
docketed and set for ·hearing. 
page 9 r Virginia : 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II. . 
Elizabeth Roller Bottimore 
v. 
The First & Merchants N a tiona! Bank of Richmond; (Mrs.) 
Wilfrid Pyle; (Miss) Lucy Roller; (Mrs.) Frances R. 
Grattan; (Mrs.) Margaret S. Ogilvie. 
THE ANSWER OF THE FIRST & MERCHANTS NA-
TIONAL BANK OF RICHMOND TO A PETITION 
IN EQUITY FILED AGAINST IT AND OTHERS' 
IN THE LAW & EQUITY COURT OF THE 
CITY OF RICHMOND, PART II, BY 
ELIZABETH ROLLER 
BOTTIMORE. 
This respondent reserving unto itself the benefit of all 
just exceptions to said petition, for answer thereto, or to so 
much thereof as it is advised it is material that it should an-
swer, answers and says: 
First: That according to the information and belief of 
this respondent the allegations contained in the first para-
graph of said petition, and the reference to the trust agree-
ment therein mentioned, are correct. 
Second : This resp~ndent is not advised as to the correct-
ness of the allegation related in the second paragraph of 
said petition, nor is it advised as to the right of the pe-
titioner, as a matter of law, to revoke the trust agreement 
referred to in the first paragraph of the petition and fully 
E. R~ Bottimore ~·First & Merchants Natl. Bank, et als. aa 
shown in "Exhibit A'' therewith filed; however, in respect 
to such matters this respondent is willing that a deterrtrl.;; 
nation be assumed and passed upon by this Honorable Court 
in this cause, the jurisdiction of such being by this 
page 10 ~ respondent admitted, or consented to. 
Third: This respondent is not advised of the 
matters herein alleged, or the conclusions which may be 
'drawn from the third paragraph of the petition. · 
Fourth : This respondent consents and agrees, if power 
and/or interest is possessed by it, that the court niay enter 
an order herein annulling; revoking and cancelling the con-
tract or trust agreement as prayed for by petitioner in this 
cause. 
And now, having fully answered; this respondent prays 
to be hence dismissed with their proper costs, etc. 
FIRST & MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK 
OF RICHMOND, 
By counsel. 
McGUIRE, RIELY & EGGLESTON, 
Counsel ft>t First and Merchants National Bank 
of Richmond. 
page 11 } Virginia : 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II; 
ElizHbeth Roller Bottimore 
v. . -
The First & Metchants National Bank of Richmond; Mrs; • 
Wilfrid Pyle ; Miss Lucy Roller; Mrs. Frances R. Grattan; 
Mrs. Margaret S. Ogilvie. 
ANSWER. 
The joint an<;l ~epara.te answer of (Miss) Lucy Roller i 
(Mrs.) Wilfrid Pyle; (Mrs.) Frances R. Grattan and (Mrs.) 
Margaret S.. Ogilvie, to a pe~itioil hi ~quity filed against them, 
and the First & Merchants National Bank of Richmond, 
in the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Pa~t 
II, by Elizabeth Roller Bottimore. 
These respondents reserving unto themselves, and each, 
the benefit of all just exceptions to said petitio~, for answer 
thereto, or to so much thereof as they, respectively, are ad-
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vised it is material that they should answer, answer and 
say: 
1st: That according to the information and belief of these 
respondents the allegations contained in the first paragraph 
of sa:id petition, and the references to the trust agreement 
therein .mentioned, are correct. 
2nd: These respondents are not advised as to the correct.: 
·ness of the allegation related in the second paragraph of 
said petition, nor are they advised as to the right of the pe-
titioner, as a matter of law, to revoke the trust agreement 
referred to in the first paragraph of the petition and fully 
shown in ''Exhibit A" therewith filed; however, in respect 
to such matters these respondents are willing and desirous 
that a determination thereof may be assumed and passed 
upon . by this I-Ionorable · Court in this cause, the 
page 12 ~ jurisdiction of such being by these respondents 
admitted, or consented to. 
3rd: These resopndents are not advised of the matters 
herein alleged, or the conclusions which may be drawn from 
the third paragraph of the petition. 
4th: These respondents aver that as alleged in the fourth 
paragraph of the petition, Mrs. Wilfrid Pyle and Lucy Roller 
are full sisters of the petitioner, while Mrs. Margaret S. 
Ogilvie, a widow, and Mrs. Frances R. Grattan, also a widow, 
are half sisters of the petitioner, the four sisters named 
being and constituting her sole next of kin. Consequently, 
these respondents assume, and admit that they are severally 
the only persons so interested, if interested they themselves 
be, in the questions and/or issues now submitted to the court; 
these respondents, moreover, jointly and severally, consent 
and agree, if power and/ or interest is by them so possessed, 
that the court may enter an order herein annulling, revoking 
and cancelling the contract or trust agreement as prayed for 
by petitioner in this cause. 
And now, having fully answered, they pray to be hence· 
dismissed with their proper costs, etc. 
MRS. WILFRID PYLE, 
MISS LUCY ROLLER,· 
FRANCES R. GRATTAN, 
MARGARET STUART OGILVIE. 
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page 13 r .And now at this day, to-wit: at a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond,. Part Two, 
held the ~7th day of May, 1937: 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the petition 
of the plaintiff with accompanying exhibit, the answer of the 
defendants, the First and Merchants National Bank of Rich-
mond, thereto, and the joint and separate answer of Mrs. 
Wilfrid Pyle, Miss Lucy Roller, Mrs. Frances R. Grattan 
and Mrs. Margaret S. Ogilvie, and was argued by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, the Court being of the opinion 
that the trust sought to be set aside and- abrogated by the 
petitioner and designated therein, and made a part thereof, 
as "Exfri.bit A", was an irrevocable trust and not subject to 
revocation as prayed for by the petitioner, the prayer of the 
plaintiff in said petition is denied and this cause is dismissed 
at the costs of the plaintiff. 
Whereupon the plaintiff indicating that it is her desire to 
perfect an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals from 
this decree, it is ordered that the operation of this decree 
be suspended for a period of ninety ( 90) days. 
page 14 r I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of 
the record in the above entitled cause wherein Elizabeth Roller 
Bottimore is plaintiff, and The First and Merchants National 
Bank of .Richmond, Mrs. Wilfrid Pyle, Miss Lucy Roller, 
Mrs. Frances R. Grattan and Mrs. Margaret S. Ogilvie are de-
fendants, and that the defendants had due notice of the in-
tention of the plaintiff to apply for such transcript. 
Witness my hand this 20th day of August, 1937. 
LUT;EIER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for Record, $6.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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